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**(clinical) psychology in search
of identity**

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...often in the din of strife,
There rises an unspeakable desire
After the knowledge of a buried life:
A thirst to spend our fire and restless force
In tracking out our true original course:
A longing to inquire
Into the mystery of this heart that beats
So wild, so deep in us - to know
Whence our lives came and where they go
Matthew Arnold

...Not chaos, not
The darkest pit of lowest Erebus,
Nor ought of blinder vacancy, scooped out
By help of dreams, can breed such fear and awe
As fall upon us when we look
Into our minds, into the Mind of Man,
My haunt, and the main region of my song
Wordsworth

What if a much of a which of a wind
gives the truth to summer's lie;
bloodies with dizzying leaves the sun
and yanks immortal stars awry?
Blow king to beggar and queen to seem
(blow friend to fiend - blow space to time)
- when skies are hanged and oceans drowned
the single secret will still be man
e.e. cummings

Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Dames en Heren.

I would like to begin my presentation by sharing with you an adapted version of a story that is to be found in many traditions. There once lived in a country far to the north a number of psychologists who were all blind in their own peculiar ways. None of them had ever seen an elephant and when it happened that the circus came to their capital city they all flocked to study the elephant which performed in one of the acts. The first to arrive was a Freudian who went immediately to the rear of the elephant and began his inspection of the animal from this chosen view. The behaviourist struck the elephant on the kneecap and was kicked across the courtyard. In another version of the story she fed the elephant an M&M every time it blinked. When asked what she doing she said that she wanted to know whether the eyelids of elephants conditioned as rapidly as those of rabbits. The cognitive psychologist began to coax the elephant into doing a newly designed test for the mapping of the mental strategies of elephants. The humanistic psychologist felt its ears and tried to convince the elephant that it could fly. The Rogerian observed the animal closely and tried to imagine what it must be like to be an elephant.

Since the biopsychologists received sponsorship for their visit to the elephant they arrived in great numbers. One tried to obtain a galvanic skin response from the footpads of the animal. Another observed its eye movements in order to determine whether elephants experience REM-sleep, and if perchance they dream. One of the neuropsychologists set out to determine the hemispheric asymmetry of elephants by examining its trunk and penis laterality. Another arrived with an arsenal of computer equipment to determine whether the latency of the P300 component of the event evoked response in the parietal area of elephants was also in the order of milliseconds. She was accompanied by a whole team of electronics experts. Some rushed around to set up the equipment while others applied the electrodes to the scalp of the elephant.

The cross-cultural psychologist shared an interest in the ears of the animal with the humanistic psychologist. By counting the number of times the animal flapped its ears and

by measuring their size he hoped to determine whether the beast was from the Asian or African continent. "The holistic psychologist never pitched up and some argued that in reality the holistic psychologist was the elephant" (Holdstock, 1987, p.44).

Another psychologist also did not arrive as planned and some said that he considered the elephant to be an illusion. When asked how such a big beast could be considered an illusion the reply was that elephants were herd animals and could only be known and understood in relation to each other and to their environment. Upon hearing this the circus owner exclaimed excitedly: "Ah, now I know why my elephant has been performing below par, and why he is so difficult to handle and in such poor physical condition despite the fact that I give him everything of the best."

THE DISUNITY OF PSYCHOLOGY: CAN THE DISCIPLINE SURVIVE?

Growing concern has been expressed about the disunity in psychology (Altman, 1987; Bevan, 1991; Giorgi, 1987; Hearnshaw, 1987; Kimble, 1984; Koch, 1969, 1981, 1985; Krantz, 1987; Madsen, 1985; Royce, 1970, 1987; Schneider, 1990; Spence, 1987; Staats, 1983, 1991; Viney, 1989; Wertheimer, 1988). Some, like Sigmund Koch, argue that a unified science of psychology is an impossibility. Others, for example Staats, recognise the present disunity but are striving towards unification. In the Netherlands, de Groot (1990) has been in the forefront in discussing the issue.

Although there are those, like Matarazzo (1987), who believe in the unity of psychology, there is no denying the strong centrifugal tendencies that are leading towards the disintegration of psychology. Bevan (1991) considers psychology to have evolved into a balkanized discipline. Staats (1981) describes psychology as being constructed of "small islands of knowledge...organised in ways that make no connection with the many other existing islands of knowledge" (p. 239). Scott (1991) has recently stated that it is only as an administrative unit that psychology continued to exist. And even as an administrative unity the future of psychology is being threatened. With the forming of new alliances between subspecialities of psychology and those of other

disciplines alternative administrative structures are likely to come about in the next century.

The diversity and fragmentation of contemporary psychology is evident "in the dozens of highly specialized, and largely noninteracting subdisciplines; the different conceptions of what constitutes the proper subject matter of psychology, different methodological approaches; different theories with regard to the same phenomenon; differences in underlying philosophical assumptions; the many (and increasing) divisions within psychological organizations; the disagreements with regard to appropriate training and educational models; and in the practitioner-scientist (professional-academic/applied-pure) schism" (Wissing, 1990, p. 5).

Staats (1991) contends that psychology is suffering "from a crisis of disunity" (p. 899). According to him the discipline "is already drowning in diversity" (p. 904). He expresses concern that there is "so much mutual discreditati-on, inconsistency, redundancy, and controversy that abstracting general meaning is a great problem" (p. 899) in psychology. "In our modern disunified science the typical approach is to take one side of the schism, attempt to enhance it, and discredit the other side - the discreditati-on then being taken as further support" (p.906). In agreement with others (Berkowitz & Devine, 1989), Staats "criticizes the current state in which researchers are driven to produce novelty, and not look for commonality. This helps show the relationship of disunity to the fadishness that is endemic in psychology" (p. 901-902).

Support for the concern expressed by Staats is easy to find. Maher (1985) describes the present state in psychology as "one of fragmentation and chaotic diversity" (p. 17), a position which MacIntyre (1988) regards as an indication of the pre-scientific stage of development of the discipline. By describing psychology as a 19th-century enterprise Bevan (1991) is obviously in agreement with the evaluation of MacIntyre.

According to Bevan (1991) the "intellectual character" (p. 475) of psychology is flawed, due to its "stubbornly reductionistic and mechanistic approach" (p. 476). The discipline consists of "a fragmented collectivity of studies of varied cast... narrowly focused and compulsively insular...We persevere in looking at small questions instead

of large ones and our view of the forest is forever obscured by the trees" (p. 475). Bevan questions "the dominance of the cult of the specialist" (p. 476) which has created an obsession with "mindless and routine recitation of detail" (p. 476), resulting in trivial papers.

Jahoda (1988) heads a section in one of his articles with the title "The journals: More and more about less and less" (p. 88). Jahoda's heading reminds me of a statement by a student in an examination several years ago. The student wrote that so little is known in psychology by so many about so few attributes. Jahoda describes much of psychological research as "futile exercises", "pedestrian", "sometimes bizarre studies carried out with admirable methodological sophistication", which when "stripped of their jargon" expose "the poverty of the core" (p. 88). Jahoda attributes "psychology's emphasis on the individual as a biological unit" (p. 91) to its quest to be scientific. By identifying uniform internal processes that can account for behaviour it hopes to achieve that aim.

However, Peele (1981, 1990) is emphatic that the promise of biochemical and neurological research to find explanations for basic aspects of human behaviour and mental disorder, will never be realised since it "fails to incorporate individual personality and subjective needs or situational and cultural variables" (1981, p. 807). Peele attributes the appeal of reductionist thinking to "its concreteness and its conciseness. It organizes behavior into exact, discrete categories; by drawing physical connections between behavior and the nervous system, it offers compact causal explanations; finally, and most important to its appeal, reductionist thought holds out the promise of clearcut remedies to problems that otherwise seem painful beyond solution" (1981, p. 807).

O'Brien (1989) describes the obsession with detail as the tyranny of the abstract. Although his comments relate to the emphasis in human movement sciences on anatomical and physiological detail, they are equally appropriate in psychology. Concern about the "chaos of fragmentation and diversity" (Royce, 1970, p. 275) in psychology has reached such proportions that Anastasi (1990) describes the rate with which the present movement towards unification is moving

forward as constituting "a significant event in the history of psychology" (p. 20).

The emotive tone of the descriptions depicting the fragmentation in psychology is a clear indication that the disunity of the discipline presents a major problem. In fact, we can rightly speak of an iatrogenically caused sickness in psychology. A student once remarked that it was rather paradoxical that psychology was so successful in creating a neurosis about the discipline itself. Although he certainly did not have the unity-disunity issue in mind, his words are nevertheless applicable in the present context.

Furthermore, I cannot help but see a similarity between the disunified science of psychology and the condition of schizophrenia. According to a number of renowned psychologists and psychiatrists the major problem in schizophrenia is the lack of acceptance by the individual and others of the strange and unfamiliar images which the person labelled as schizophrenic is experiencing (Hillman, 1975; Perry, 1974; Laing, 1969, 1970; Szasz, 1961, 1987). Not only is there a lack of acceptance of the alternative aspects of the self in schizophrenia, but there is an active rejection of and open warfare between the separate manifestations. The same is true between the various specializations of psychology.

Disunity in clinical psychology

It is not only at the conceptual, the experimental, and the methodological level that the fragmentation within psychology is rampant, but also at the applied level (Lemmens, de Ridder, & van Lieshout, 1991). In 1959 Harper described 36 systems of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. With the publication of *The New Psychotherapies* in 1975 he found the proliferation too extensive to tabulate numerically, though this has been done by others. According to one account the number of theories of psychotherapy has doubled during the past 10 years (see Staats, 1991). In 1980 more than a 100 were noted and a decade later the estimate has doubled. According to another report the 'schools' of psychotherapy "has risen like a fevered white cell count", from an estimate of 130 in 1976, to 250 in 1980, to 300 in 1986 according to one account and over 460 in another (Omer & London, 1988, p.171)! And we have the audacity to diagno-

se individuals as having multiple personalities. Talk about mindsplitt! Psychotherapy heal thyself!

The fact that clinical psychology is one of the fastest growing professions of the century (Gergen, 1990), is not only evident in the proliferation of psychotherapies, but also in the diagnostic armament available today. According to Buros (1975) there were 2467 standardized tests in print as of early 1974. Of these 441 were personality tests. With an increase, estimated by Buros to be 3,2% per year, that number could be calculated to have grown to 680 by 1992. The evaluation of the abilities, shortcomings and characteristics of people has grown into a major industry.

It is especially with respect to the diagnosis and labelling of what is wrong with people that we have become such experts. 'You' messages in the form of labelling inappropriate behaviour and problems in living proliferate. The revised **Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R)** (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) lists some 292 categories of mental disorder, in addition to a variety of 'problematic behaviours', such as stress and burnout. And the DSM-IV is already in the offing. Sarbin (1990) speaks of an "obsessive preoccupation with diagnosis" (p. 272). Gergen (1990) calls it a "diffusion of deficit" (p. 353) "expanding exponentially within the present century" (p. 360). "As the language of psychological deficit has expanded, so have we increased the culture's hierarchies of discrimination, damaged the naturalized patterns of interdependence, and expanded the arena of deprecation. In effect, as the language of deficit has proliferated, so has the culture become progressively infirmed" (Gergen, 1990, p. 361).

"To describe a person as 'mentally ill,' 'schizo-phrenic,' 'manic-depressive,' etc., means operationally that therapists hold low expectations for these individuals. We cannot help human beings to solve their developmental crises if we insist on defining these crises as symptoms of chronic mental illnesses. If we verbally encourage human beings to succeed while expecting them to fail, our encouragement is facile" (Faber, 1990, p. 298).

"How may I fault thee? Let me count the ways...

Impulsive personality	Low self-esteem
Malingering	Narcissism
Reactive depression	Bulimia
Anorexia	Neurasthenia
Hysteria	Hypochondriasis
Mania	Dependent personality
Psychopathia	Frigidity
Peter Pan syndrome	Voyeurism
External control orientation	Authoritarianism
Anti-social personality	Transvestism
Exhibitionism	Agoraphobia
Seasonal affective disorder..." (Gergen, 1990, p.353).	

The disease model of psychology is in keeping with the medical orientation to the discipline and with the pretention of belonging to the hard sciences. The disease construction of mental illness "originated during a period of rapid growth of biological science based on mechanistic principles" (Sarbin, 1990, p. 259). However, there is a concerted effort afoot to review this orientation, to point out that it impedes an understanding of 'mental illness' (Brown, 1987, 1990; Frank, 1990; Mirowsky, 1990; Mirowsky & Ross, 1989a,b). A special issue of *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* (Summer/Autumn 1990) has been devoted to **Challenging the Therapeutic State**. In this issue Farber (1990) states "that psychology must choose between two different modes of being in the world. By continuing to pursue the ideal of the objective scientist who can stand outside of history and subject humanity to methodological control, psychology is only succeeding in tightening the 'mind-forged manacles' that prevent human beings from realizing their innate potential. This idolatry of scientific method represents the most tragic kind of epistemological hubris. Its claim to validity is belied by the findings of experimenter bias...We are not machines in a mechanical universe but artists in a wonder-land where God (i.e., meaning) is continually assuming unexpected guises, startling us with unpredictable revelations and opportunities" (p. 297).

We desperately need to revision our language of deficit and develop "alternative vocabularies within the mental health profession, vocabularies that (1) do not trace problematic behavior to psychological sources within single indivi-

duals and (2) ultimately erase the concept of 'problem behavior' itself. I am speaking here first of the development of a vocabulary of relatedness that would come to equal the rhetorical power of individualized language in making the social world intelligible" (Gergen, 1990, p. 365). "Different metaphors would entail different social consequences" (Farber, 1990, p. 293). Besides, abundant evidence exists which indicates the cultural relativity of what constitutes socially maladjusted behaviour (see Holdstock, 1979; Marsella & White, 1989). We also need to become aware of how the disease or defect model serves the interests of the bureaucratic networks at national and local level and how it legitimizes the hypothetical nature of such diagnostic categories as schizophrenia (Farber, 1990; Gergen, 1990; Sarbin, 1990).

PARADIGM CLASHES BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY'S CULTURES

The fragmentation of psychology is proliferating at a rate which does not allow space for all its specialities and sub-specialities. The psychological household is locked in a family feud (Kimble, 1984). With a world-wide economic recession the battle for a share of the available resources often occurs to the detriment of the discipline itself. Paradigms clash and, as Kuhn (1962) has shown, bitter emotional antagonisms and a total rejection of the other result from such clashes. While major political changes have taken place in the communist bloc of countries and in South Africa, our discipline shows little evidence of resolving its paradigm conflicts. We might yet prove to be more intransigent than the most rigid and conservative political regimes. The battle in psychology is not just a simple but a complicated faction fight, which can perhaps be demonstrated best by using the metaphor of cultures within psychology to identify some of the issues involved.

Natural science versus human science psychology

Peterson (1985) describes the ideological conflict in psychology as one between the cultures of science and practice. Earlier William James (eg. 1907) distinguished between tough- and tender-minded intellectual styles, a polarity conceptualised by Kimble (1984) as that between scientist and humanist values. Spence (1987) speaks of the "hard-headed"

and "soft-hearted". Staats (1991) has recently described the historical tension as one between a "natural science psychology and a human science psychology" (p. 902). Manicas and Secord (1983) use the terms objectivist and subjectivist to identify the divergency in social theory.

Of all the cultural clashes which earmark psychology, none has a longer history and is of greater importance than that between the orientation towards psychology as a natural or a human science. The "values according to which status is ascribed in academic systems" require "that faculty identify with the scientist role in order to avoid an experience of alienation and failure within the larger institution" (Trierweiler, 1987, p.410). It is primarily for this reason that the natural science model has prevailed in psychology despite the chorus of voices being raised against it as the dominant paradigm.

19th Century science alive and well in psychology

The critique of the natural science approach to psychology has primarily been directed at the reductionistic level of analysis and at the methodology which is based "on the ideological tradition of the physical sciences of the 19th century" (Bevan, 1991, p. 478). Koch (1981), the respected scholar delegated by the American Psychological Association and the National Science Foundation to assess the status of psychology as a science, concludes that "... much of psychology's history can be seen as a form of scientific role playing which, however sophisticated, entails the trivialization and even evasion of significant problems" (p. 257). In his summary of 374 reports of experiments designed to illuminate the concept of schizophrenia Sarbin (1990) came to the same conclusion. He stated that all the studies "were constructed for the purpose of vigorously testing miniature hypotheses" (p. 265). In very much the same vein Petrino-vich (1979) questions the adequacy of traditional research designs to yield generalizations beyond the particular experimental paradigm. He queries whether it is possible to prevent the essence of human existence from getting lost in the manner in which psychologists approach their science.

Peterson (1985) cautions against quenching the concern of students "for others in a cold objectivity that does not suit our discipline in the first place" (p. 450). For most of his

career Carl Rogers expressed similar concerns. During his years at Wisconsin he made a passionate plea for a graduate education in psychology which respected the students as human beings and not just as information processing entities. Shortly before his death he wrote, as he had done so often in the past, that "the living, acting, whole human being has very little place" in psychology (Rogers, 1985, p.8). He again stressed the importance of searching for models of science that would be appropriate to human beings.

→ According to Tseëlon (1991) we need to be fully aware of the fact that the method of no-frills empiricism represents an ideology that shapes outcome and produces meaning in a very definite way. She argues that all methods are "ideological in that they are the codes through which facts are defined, and acquire meaning. The implications ... are that a choice of method is neither a technical neutral move, nor a choice between more or less truthful accounts of reality; rather, it is commitment to a particular metaphor of human behaviour, and a particular picture of reality" (p. 300). "Thus, by choosing a certain method we are opting for a particular picture of humans. It is not a question of accuracy, but a question of values" (p. 313). Method determines outcome and meaning and at the same time reflects the values of the dominant culture or ruling class. It is for these reasons that it is necessary that we are fully cognisant of the implications of our choice of method.

Developmental psychology

As already indicated increasing numbers of psychologists within the mainstream experimental orientation share in the concern about the methodologically pure but psychologically vapid output of our laboratories. According to Urie Bronfenbrenner and his colleagues, developmental psychology is "looking more and more at less and less" (Bronfenbrenner, Kessel, Kessen, & White, 1986, p. 1219). They illustrate their point with a different version of the story of the elephant and the psychologists. Their rendering is of the Russian tale of a man who visited the zoo and saw all manner of creatures, such as flies and beetles, ladybirds, butterflies, and insects with heads no bigger than pins; however, he missed seeing the elephant.

At a recent meeting of the Jean Piaget Society, Gergen (1991b) expressed the opinion that the continued "belief in the individual as the center of meaning" (p. 4), prevented Piaget and developmental psychology from determining how understanding could occur between children, and ultimately how meaning could be transmitted between people. According to Gergen, developmental psychology needs to shift its focus towards "relational accounts of human development. That is, rather than viewing development either in terms of ontogenetic unfolding (heredity), or in terms of environmental impact (environment), analysis may profitably center on relational units and processes" (p. 24). He calls for the consideration of human development, not only in terms of family, friends and the community, but "fully enmeshed in the economic, political, educational, technological and other practices of the culture" (p. 25).

Materialistic versus metaphysical values

The plea for a scientific approach which would be more appropriate to human beings also finds expression in the juxtapositioning of metaphysical and materialistic values in the scientific process (Akbar, 1984; Bevan, 1991; O'Donohue, 1989; Schwartz, 1990). Schwartz contends that the scientific study of values will not progress unless we can accept the metaphysical components of our discipline. O'Donohue points out that "the practice of science and psychotherapy involve metaphysics to such an extent that the clinical psychologist ought to be considered a metaphysician-scientist-practitioner?" (p. 1460). Bevan is of the opinion that "psychology's failure to confront fundamental metaphysical issues is what makes it a 'would be discipline'" (p. 475).

Transpersonal perspectives

Apart from the voices belonging to the main stream of American psychology calling for the creation of a more exact science of the person, there are many from within the human science tradition. Indeed there are too many to acknowledge here. Two representatives will have to speak for their colleagues. Tart (1975) wrote that "orthodox, Western psychology has dealt very poorly with the spiritual side of human nature, choosing either to ignore its presence or to label it

pathological. Yet, much of the agony of our times stems from the spiritual vacuum" (p. 5).

Perhaps no one in the Western world is more direct and brutal in evaluating present day psychology than the eminent Jungian scholar and archetypal psychologist, James Hillman (1975). "And this psychology, for which we erect great buildings to which the students flock, with its libraries, lectures and laboratories, journals and therapies, mental health clinics and mental health grants, has been and still is impotent. Nothing, nothing, nothing ... Its pragmatism, whether in clinic or in laboratory, kills fantasy or subverts it into the service of practical goals" (p. 220). Hillman pleads passionately for the restoration of the psyche of psychology. And so do I.

Africentric perspectives

The criticism and pleas of Hillman are echoed equally strongly and passionately by Afro-American scholars (eg. Akbar, 1984; Asante, 1983; Baldwin, 1986). According to Akbar "The oversimplification of Western social science, though impressively more manageable, is disastrously myopic in its exclusion of blatantly causal realities. Logical positivism and reductionism have tried to make men and women thoroughly rational and minute enough to fit a micro model of a unidimensional view of humanity" (p. 405). Blake (1981), another Afro-American scholar, therefore suggests that the term 'method' be rethought Afrocentrically.

It is no small wonder, therefore, that Akbar (1984) regards what he describes as Eurocentric psychology to be "essentially useless as an instrument of human liberation" (p. 399). Not only is Eurocentric psychology ineffective and flawed, as Bevan (1991) and others have argued, but the exclusive reliance on "individualism, rationalism and materialism ... renders Western social science an effective instrument of human oppression and exploitation" (Akbar, 1984, p. 403).

In addition to Afro-American social scientists, renowned African scholars and statesmen have been equally critical in their evaluation of the Western way of life, and by implication of psychology. Among these are Senghor (Reed & Wake, 1979), Césaire (1969), Fanon (1970; 1976) and Mphahlele (1962). The powerful voice of Senghor, the retired

poet-president of Senegal, and for many years a member of the French parliament, speaks for the others. He describes the European as: "An objective intelligence, a man of will, a warrior, a bird of prey, a steady gaze. He first distinguishes the object from himself. He keeps it at a distance. He freezes it out of time and, in a way, out of space. He fixes it, he kills it. With his precision instruments he dissects it in a pitiless factual analysis. As a scientist, yet at the same time prompted by practical considerations, the European makes use of the Other that he has killed in this way for his practical ends. He makes a means of it. With a centripetal movement he assimilates it. He destroys it by devouring it. 'White men are cannibals', an old sage from my own country told me a few years ago. 'They have no respect for life'" (Reed & Wake, 1979, p. 20).

Cultures of the independent and interdependent self

The independent self: A critical perspective

In keeping with the fragmented nature of the natural science approach to psychology, it is not at all surprising that the unit of study in psychology is the autonomous and independent individual. Just as the aim of research is to investigate "new and different phenomena, not of finding relationships between them" (Staats, 1991, p. 899-900), the stress in the Western world is on "attending to the self, the appreciation of one's difference from others, and the importance of asserting the self" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 224). There "is a faith in the inherent separateness of distinct persons. The normative imperative ... is to become independent from others and to discover and express one's unique attributes ... behavior is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action, rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 226). It "was around the issue of individualization that psychology constituted itself as a scientific discipline in its own right" (Rose, 1989, p. 119).

However, the disenchantment with the excesses of the natural scientific tradition in psychology and the growing concern about psychology's monocultural orientation prepa-

red the ground for a lively debate about the focus on the individual as a self-contained entity (for references see Holdstock, 1990b, 1991b; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). A multitude of descriptions of the Western self has emerged from this debate. In addition to being described as monocultural, the approach to the self as a demarcated entity has also been depicted as monotheistic (Johnson, 1985), ethnocentric (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, in press), egocentric and egotistical (Sampson, 1985), individualistic (Johnson, 1985), idiocentric, separate, autonomous (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), individuocentric (Jahoda, 1988), monadic (Cushman, 1991), selfish (Schwartz, 1986), self-contained (Sampson, 1988), bounded (Geertz, 1974), self-reliant (Spence, 1985), independent (Spence, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), a centralized equilibrium structure (Sampson, 1985), abstract (Shweder & Bourne, 1989), rationalistic (Johnson, 1985), private (Rose, 1990), bourgeois (Sampson, 1989b; Slugoski & Ginsburg, 1989), saturated (Gergen, 1991a), as well as empty (Cushman, 1990).

It is evident from the adjectives used to describe the Western concept of the self that the prevailing approach is being subjected to intensive questioning. Sampson (1985) expresses the opinion that it is psychology's emphasis on the individual as a closed rather than an open system that is one of the main factors which prevents the discipline from developing meaningfully. Concern about the shortcomings of the exclusive focus on the autonomous individual in the prevailing monocultural orientation derives not only from several areas within psychology but also from disciplines other than psychology.

Mainstream psychology

The debate on individualism which has been going on in the the pages of the *American Psychologist*, the official mouthpiece of the American Psychological Association (APA), during the past decade can be considered to represent the soul searching within mainstream psychology (e.g. Albee, 1982, 1986; Azuma, 1984a, 1984b; Bandura, 1982; Bevan, 1982; Campbell, 1975; Corlett, 1988; Cushman, 1990; Dansereau, 1989; Gibbs & Schnell, 1985; Ho, 1985; Hogan, 1975; Koch, 1981; Kojima, 1984; Levy, 1984; Payton, 1984; Perloff, 1987; Peterson, 1985; Prilleltensky,

1989; Sampson, 1985, 1988, 1989a; Sarason, 1981; Spence, 1985; Waterman, 1981; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984a,b).

With the exception of Perloff (1987), the majority of articles in the *American Psychologist* question the individual-centric basis of psychology. In her APA Presidential Address Janet Spence (1985), for example, warns against the excessive individualism of psychology as reflected in theories of achievement and achievement motivation. In his APA Presidential Address, Donald Campbell, points out that modern psychology is hedonistic, "explaining all human behavior in terms of individual pleasure and pain, individual positive and negative valence, individual positive and negative drives" (p. 1115). He reminds us that "psychology and psychiatry, not only describe man as selfishly motivated, but implicitly or explicitly teach that he ought to be so. They tend to see repression, and inhibition of individual impulse as undesirable, and see all guilt as a dysfunctional neurotic blight created by cruel child rearing and a needlessly repressive society. They further recommend that we accept our biological and psychological impulses as good and seek pleasure rather than enchain ourselves with duty" (p. 1104).

In tracing the history of the Western self over the course of the last 2500 years, Cushman (1991) argues that the "self changes over time not because of some essential inner nature or metaphysical evolution" (p. 208), but in order to accommodate and comply with the political and economic requirements of specific eras. The predominant form of the masterful, bounded Western self, which Cushman describes as "the communally isolated, empty, consumer self, hungry for food, consumer items, and charismatic leaders" (p. 208), is therefore attributed to the historical context of the post-World War II era. He warns that "To consider this self to be the single, universal self is to overlook its particular, local nature and thus to excuse its characteristic illnesses, mystify its political and economic constituents, and obscure its ideological functions" (p. 208). Sampson (1989b) similarly warns that the self as a "distinctive universe is said to reflect the sham and the illusion that is the bourgeois individual, not its reality" (p. 3).

Sampson (1988) calls on Bateson and Lewin to point out that although Western culture locates the origin of control

inside the person, the actual determination lies within a larger system or field. He also argues that the work of Foucault and Weber demonstrates that the historical process of individualization reflects a change in societal control rather than a freeing of the individual from social authority. Collective and communal loyalties and responsibilities are replaced by bureaucratization of aspects of social life governed by highly abstract, impersonal rules and principles. The loss of communal self necessitated the institution of laws to govern the behaviour of people. Although the illusion of being more free was created, people had less freedom. Failure to adhere to the dictates laid down by bureaucratic institutions was met by more severe sanction than that experienced under a system of communal obligation.

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Social constructionism

The overwhelming emphasis on the individual self in psychology at present is rather difficult to understand, for a social constructionist perspective of the self dates back to both the distant and recent past. In the **Phenomenology of Spirit** Hegel (1770-1831) constituted that "the individual self was in no sense immediately given, but a socially created concept (Van der Veer, 1985, p. 7). According to Hegel there was no individual self prior to the interaction with other people. "The self is formed through the interaction with other people" (p. 7).

Van der Veer (1985) traces the influence of Hegel in the thinking of William James and through James, but also directly, in the work of Herbert Mead and Vygotsky. The influence of Hegel and James is not only to be found in the writings of the symbolic interactionists (Mead, 1968), and the early social constructionists (see Gordon & Gergen, 1968), but in the writings of the cognitive theorists (Kelly, 1955; Lewin, 1951; Rotter, 1954) as well. Especially the recent renaissance of Vygotskian theory testifies of the shift towards the social. However, except in the work of a number of present day theorists (e.g. Cushman, 1991; Gergen, 1989; Harré, 1989; Sampson, 1989b), the social remains secondary to the individual. According to these latter day theorists the self is not only constructed and constituted in interaction with others, but is also constituted historically, as

well as within the socio-economic-political-and cultural context.

In recent thinking along constructionist lines the dialogical nature of the self has been highlighted. Tiryakian (1968) states that "I am what I say" (p. 80). According to him "The self's disclosure in language means that it is a giving - and perhaps the fundamental gift and giving as a human activity is words" (p. 81). Hillman (1975) agrees. Although he cannot be regarded as a social constructionist, Hillman calls for the rediscovery of the oral tradition. True to his archetypal orientation he argues that words "burn and become flesh as we speak...We need to recall the angel aspect of the word, recognizing words as independent carriers of soul between people...Words, like angels, are powers which have invisible power over us" (p. 9). Translated in constructionist terms Hillman pleads for recognition of the cultural processes in which words are embedded. "Words acquire communicative capacity by virtue of shared usage" (Gergen & Gergen, 1988).

Hermans and his coworkers (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, in press) consider the self to be a dialogical narrator, "(a) spatially organized and embodied and (b) social, with the other not outside but in the self-structure, resulting in a multiplicity of dialogically interacting selves. The embodied nature of the self contrasts with conceptions of a disembodied or 'rationalistic' mind" (p.3). More recently, recognition of the importance of the narrative component of the physical body has been called for (see Holdstock, 1991c).

In several of his publications Gergen has reiterated the self as a narrative constructed within social life. Narratives "of the self are not fundamentally possessions of the individual; rather they are products of social interchange" (Gergen & Gergen, 1988, p. 18). It "is not the individual who preexists the relationship and initiates the process of signification, but patterns of relationship and their embedded meanings that preexists the individual" (Gergen, 1991b, p. 12).

"Yet, to focus on the face-to-face relationship may ultimately be delimited. For we find that whether I make sense is not under my control, nor is it ultimately under the control of the dyad in which the potential for meaning initially struggles toward realization. Rather, meaningful communication in any given situation ultimately depends on a protracted array of relationships,

not only 'right here, right now,' but how it is that you and I are related to a variety of other persons, and they to still others - and ultimately, one might say, to the relational conditions of society as a whole. We are all in this way interdependently interlinked - without the capacity to mean anything, to possess an 'I' - after all, a position within discourse - except for the fact of a potentially assenting world of relation-ships" (Gergen, 1991b, p. 18).

Social psychology

Of the concern expressed in psychology about individualism, that emanating from humanistic (Greening, 1986), social (e.g. Adamopoulos, 1988; Armistead, 1974; Jacoby, 1977; Jahoda, 1988; Jones, 1986; Resler & Walton, 1974) and clinical psychology (Albee, 1982, 1986; Holdstock, 1990a, 1991a, 1991b; Ho, 1985; Perloff, 1987), is of special interest. Even social psychology has been accused of **social amnesia** (Jacoby, 1977). The criticism of social psychology's fragmentation and insularity gathered force in the seventies with Gergen, Moscovici, and Pepitone being credited as forerunners (Gabrenya, 1988). According to Gergen and Gergen (1988) "the emphasis on stable mechanisms or processes 'within the heads' of single individuals (e.g. attitudes, stereotypes, schemas, traits) has inhibited the growth of theory that takes social interdependency to be its major focus" (p. 53). "Pepitone (1981) notes how the values of psychology as a whole - empiricism, objectivism, behaviorism, operationalism, reductionism, materialism, mechanism, universalism, and individualism - have in turn shaped social psychology, particularly its individuocentric treatment of group dynamics" (Gabrenya, 1988.p. 50). Due to these values social psychology, as well as the other fields of psychology, has become culturally increasingly more insular and isolated from the social sciences.

Jacoby (1977) is one of many who criticizes "the individualistic orientation of present-day social psychology" (p. 105). Others (Hayes, 1984) criticize social psychology for the micro-social analysis of interpersonal relationships. "In its attempt to develop a rigorous, universalistic social psychology, the social cognitive group has brought to social psychology an even lower unit of analysis deep inside the

organism, and has promoted cultural and disciplinary insularity to a greater extent than any other single development" (Sampson, 1981, p. 53). Armistead (1974) asked of social psychology to look carefully at the social context of behaviour and experience and be involved in bringing about social change. According to Resler and Walton (1974) "What is necessary for the reconstruction of social psychology is to analyse people's psychic development and responses within a historical perspective, which recognizes that the limits on behaviour are shaped by the relations between power, politics and people" (p.290).

Clinical Psychology

Sarason (1981) goes so far as to blame the asocial nature of social psychology for contributing to the psychiatric course which clinical psychology has been following. If social psychology had been more social it would have formed the basis for a clinical psychology which emphasized primary prevention and the social determinants of maladjustment. If this had been the case clinical psychologists would have been better able to work effectively within the political environment to formulate public policies to aid these efforts. He describes the advent of clinical psychology during the post-World War II period as "the beginning of a disaster" (p. 827) because it failed to prepare psychology for the public arena. Others are in agreement (Albee, 1986; Ryan, 1971; Wineman, 1984).

Albee (1982) pleads for recognition of the "role of poverty, meaningless work, unemployment, racism, and sexism in producing psychopathology" (p. 1043). "Nowhere is the futility of psychotherapy as obvious as among the poor and powerless whose suffering, crowding, and despair will yield only to social and political solutions...one-to-one treatment, medical or psychological, does not, and cannot, affect incidence" (Albee, 1990, p. 369). Albee warns against an "increasing medicalization of psychiatry, along with strong and growing opposition to efforts at social change aimed at alleviating the environmental stresses that are responsible for the higher rates of emotional disturbance among the poor, the powerless, the disenfranchised and the exploited" (p. 1043). Just as the promotion of physical health is primarily due to improved environmental conditions (Illich, 1976), the

promotion of mental health is likely to be subject to improvement in the socio-economic- and political conditions. But how do we break out of our reactive cocoon? As a first step it would seem necessary that we become aware of and question the validity of our prevailing paradigms (eg. Nelson, 1985). Cook (1985) queries whether we are content to be merely reactive or should we at least try to be innovative and proactive in fulfilling our duty as clinical psychologists? How do we promote human welfare other than by just practicing psychotherapy? (Levy, 1984).

Recently, Stanley Graham (Graham & Fox, 1991), during his term of office as APA President, pointed out to a group of leaders convened to discuss postdoctoral professional education "that current postdoctoral education tends to focus on dynamic, long-term psychotherapy and does little to prepare practitioners to meet the needs of a world confronted with vast social changes. For a large portion of the population, failing social networks have led to increased poverty, violence, and wasteful addictive diseases. Resources have fallen far short of the needs of children and the aged, and deinstitutionalization has filled U.S. cities with thousands of people who are unable to care for themselves. Graham contended that psychology has failed to establish an effective system of community services to ameliorate these social ills and he called on those assembled to plan postdoctoral training programs that would produce practitioners with the vision and expertise to develop service delivery systems that were both cost efficient and productive of positive results" (p. 1034).

Since its influence has been so pervasive the Person-Centered approach of Carl Rogers has been singled out for criticism in failing to prepare psychology for the public arena. Sarason claims that while publication of Rogers' (1942) *Counseling and Psychotherapy* effectively initiated "The age of psychotherapy ... it defined ... the problems of people in terms of an individual psychology: Problems were personal or narrowly interpersonal and for all practical purposes independent of the nature and structure of the social order" (p. 830). Farson (1974) also criticizes Rogers for paying too little attention to the importance of power, status, politics, culture, history, systems, and technology in human relationships.

Considerable debate exists as to whether Person-Centered therapy has an exclusively individual focus (eg. Geller, 1982; Ho, 1985; Holdstock, 1990a, 1991a; Patterson, 1986; Rogers, 1979; Sarason, 1981; Turton, 1986). Rogers undoubtedly rejected narcissistic individualism. "We seem as a culture to have made a fetish out of complete individual self-sufficiency, of not needing help, of being completely private except in a very few selected relationships" (Rogers, 1979, p. 12). Yet, his point of departure remained firmly embedded in empowering the individual person (Rogers, 1977). Since its inception the self-actualizing and self-directing qualities of people have been core assumptions of the Person-Centered approach. Even in the social outreach of the theory, empowering the individual remained the focus through which societal change was thought to be brought about.

How can we ever hope to combat the mental health problem if we continue to focus on the individual while the context within which the individual is embedded is in need of attention? As will be argued in a later section, it is necessary to realise the importance in the causation of mental illness, not only of socio-economic- and political factors but of cultural variables as well. It is also necessary to realise that socio-economic-political- and cultural variables are not only inextricably intertwined with the subject matter of our discipline but with who we are as psychologists. In addition, we need to be aware that how we behave as psychologists not only reflects the socio-economic-political-cultural status quo but at the same time shapes it. It is in the context of our lack of awareness in this regard that the damning critique from within, as well as from outside the discipline, especially from Afro-American and third world social scientists and scholars, must be seen.

The shift in awareness towards multicultural perspectives has focused attention on a number of important issues. One in particular relates to the variety and complexity of problems involved in cross-cultural counselling and mental health (see Holdstock, 1990a, 1991a), and on the shortcomings of indigenous Western psychological practices in coping with these issues. Associated with this awareness has been the realisation that "People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of

the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 224).

Varied alternate perspectives

Apart from the sources of critique of the independent self mentioned above, critical voices have also emanated from many other areas. These are discussed in more detail somewhere else (see Holdstock 1991b). Among these should be noted feminist studies (Josselson, 1987, 1990; Sampson, 1989b;), critical theory (Sampson, 1985, 1989b), the challenge to liberal individualism (MacIntyre, 1988; Sampson, 1989a), deconstructionism (Barratt & Strauss, 1989; Haré-Mustin & Marecek, 1989; Walkup, 1989), various transcultural disciplines, eg. cultural and psychological anthropology (Hallowell, 1976), transcultural psychiatry (Kleinman, 1980), cross-cultural (Bond, 1988) and indigenous psychologies (Diaz-Guerrero, 1977; Heelas & Lock, 1981), human movement studies (see Holdstock, 1991c), the sociology of Marx, Engels, Parsons, Durkheim, Weber, and Sorokin, and philosophy (Buber, 1970; Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1970; Ryan, 1989; Theunissen, 1984). The need to revision the individualistic orientation of psychology has also surfaced in the Netherlands (Jansz, 1991).

Various developments within the natural sciences, although not dealing directly with the nature of the independent self, nevertheless contribute meaningfully to its revisioning. Among these are developments within the field of holism (Bentov, 1977; Smuts, 1926; Wilber, 1984; Young, 1986), general systems theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1969; Laszlo, 1972), unified field theory (Bohm, in Wilber, 1982), holonomic theory (Pribram, in press), and nonequilibrium theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).

Although it is not possible to elaborate on each of these in detail the divergent nature of the sources of critique needs to be pointed out and one or two areas elaborated on. That such diverse disciplines as philosophy, the human movement sciences, anthropology, various scientific disciplines (including subatomic physics and chemistry), sociology, and feminist studies, all stress the importance of the self as agent in relation, is indeed a remarkable phenomenon (Dokecki,

1990; Holdstock, 1991b). Developments within each discipline contribute uniquely to the re-visioning of the self. For instance, the natural sciences extend the relatedness of the individual to the physical universe, as do several non-Western cultures. The human movement sciences provide an appropriate umbrella for elaborating the activity component without which the self cannot be known, and the psychological importance of the body. The self emerges in what we do or do not do, and in how we behave towards each other.

Feminist studies

Several feminist and post-feminist writers have proposed an alternative to the autonomous and non-relational model of the self. According to them the emphasis on the separation-individuation side of identity reflects the male perspective. The female perspective refers to "the other voice" with which many women seem to confront the world and in terms of which they frame their understanding. This is the voice of connections and relationships rather than the voice of boundaries and separations" (Sampson, 1988, p. 18).

"Women move along in the world through relational connections ... The notion of a separate identity or a separate sense of self is not quite the same in women as in men" (Josselson, 1987, p. 169-170). Women grow up with a relational sense of self. Identity means 'being with'. Without others there is no sense of a fulfilled self. The more there is of others the more there is of self, and vice-versa. Identity seems to be a matter of defining the internal experience of the self through attachment to others. Unlike males, who are brought up in a culture stressing self-assertion, mastery, individual distinction, and separateness, what Bakan (1966) called **agency**, women are raised in a culture of **communion**, stressing contact, union, cooperation, and being together. For many women communion is more important than agency. To be related is itself an expression of agentic needs for assertion, mastery, and achievement. Skill and success in relatedness become keystones of identity. Women's sense of self is organized around the ability to make and maintain relationships.

Josselson (1990) discusses seven dimensions of relationship as foundations and expressions of identity, varying

from the most basic needs of holding and attachment to embeddedness (the we of me), and the offering of tenderness and care. "Our developmental psychology, as well as our culture, has tended to equate maturity with independence and impenetrable personal boundaries, thus relegating the interpenetration of selves in relatedness to a less mature form of existence" (Josselson, 1987, p. 185). We should rather strive to make heroic the achievement of intimacy and care. However, we lack the terms of discourse to conceptualize the myriad of connections that people make with one another. The poverty of the language and its ability to capture the depth of feeling is especially important in the light of the dialogical aspect of the self and the importance of searching for the soul in words, as Hillman (1975) so desperately wants us to do.

The moral of the feminist perspective is clear. Embeddedness and care need to be respected and valued more highly by society. Just as our developmental ethos needs to be changed with respect to the raising of boys, our scientific ethos also needs to change. Elsewhere I have written that "Boys should be exposed to the same training that girls traditionally receive in our society, and should be encouraged to develop similar kinds of socially positive, tender, cooperative, nurturing, and sensitive qualities" (Holdstock, 1990c, p. 363). It is very unlikely that relatedness is central only to the identity of women. In all likelihood it is central to the identity of males as well, even though men do not quite realise to what extent, geared as they are towards the language of power and assertion. We need to train natural science oriented psychologists in the same way that we need to train boys and men. We need to encourage their ability to be intimate and to care, and we need human science oriented psychologists who are able to apply cognitive information processing strategies in their professional endeavours. We need to realise that the functional hemispheric asymmetry of our split brain psychology will never be able to function optimally unless we begin to integrate the divergent functions and aspects of our fragmented selves.

The non-Western interdependent self

Closely related to the feminist concept of the self is that of many non-Western cultures. According to Geertz (1974), the "Western concept of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures" (p. 275).

Concomitant with the realisation that individuals in Western nations do not adequately represent human populations everywhere (Jahoda, 1988; Malpass, 1988) grew the awareness that non-Western cultures entertain a totally different model of the self. Whereas all cultures recognise the individual as empirical agent, considerable differences exist with respect to the exclusivity of the self-nonselv boundary and the locus of control in the self or the field. In contrast to the individuocentric model of self which prevails in the West, non-Western cultures entertain a decidedly more collective view of the self. A concept of self independent from others is unthinkable. Attending to and "fitting in with others and the importance of harmonious interdependence with them" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 224) is what is of the greatest importance. The "self is viewed as interdependent with the surrounding context, and it is the 'other' or the 'self-in-relation-to-the other' that is focal in individual experience" (p. 225). Thus, it is not the inner self but the **relationships** of the person to other persons that is of the greatest importance.

A wealth of information has accumulated in cultural and psychological anthropology, transcultural psychiatry, and in cross-cultural and indigenous psychologies during the past few decades, indicating that the other and society are integral components of the self. Kohlberg (in Gibbs & Schnell, 1985) describes the basic unit of society in non-Western cultures as a "bi-polar self-other relationship...born out of the social or sharing process" (p. 1074). Baldwin (1968) speaks of the bipolar self in developmental terms. According to him "the only thing that remains more or less stable, throughout the whole growth, is the fact that there is a gro-

wing sense of self which includes both terms, the ego and the alter. In short, the real self is the bipolar self, the socius" (p. 165). Shweder and Bourne (1989) describe the bipolar self as sociocentric-organic. "Linked to each other in an interdependent system, members of organic cultures take an active interest in one another's affairs, and feel at ease regulating and being regulated...the concept of the autonomic individual, free to choose and mind his own business, must feel alien, a bizarre idea cutting the self off from the interdependent whole, dooming it to a life of isolation and loneliness" (p. 132).

Many non-Western cultures have thus far been documented as portraying "the self as constituted by social context rather than by an individuated psychological core" (Miller, 1988, p.273). These cultures are, in alphabetical order: African, Balinese, Chewong of Malaysia, Chinese, Filipino, Gahuku-Gama of New Guinea, Indian, Inuit, Islamic, Japanese, Javanese, Nepalese, Maori, Moroccan, Ojibwa Indians of North America, and the Zapotec of Mexico (see Holdstock, 1991b for references).

Numerous examples exist in the various cultures of the different ways in which the principles of the interdependent self find expression. Among these are the supreme Chinese virtue of *jen*, which implies "the person's capability to interact with fellow human beings in a sincere, polite, and decent fashion" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 228), and the concept of *simpatico* among Hispanics which "refers to the ability to both respect and share others' feelings" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 228). Among the Japanese the concept of *sassulu*, which is of the highest priority, means to always consider other people first.

In many non-Western societies being separated from other people implies a personal, cultural sense of hell. The Hindu and African cultures are among such societies. I have written elsewhere of the importance of relatedness in Africa (eg. Holdstock, 1987, Ch. 10; 1990d). *Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* - a person is a person through other persons - embodies the essence of the concept of the person in Africa. Stated differently, it is believed that 'I am because we are and because we are, therefore I am.' Yet another way to express the same belief is in terms of the African saying of 'I belong therefore I am' as contrasted to the Cartesian dictum

of 'I think therefore I am.' Of the many other concepts portraying the importance of relatedness, none is more expressive than **ubuntu** (Nguni) or **botho** (Sotho). **Ubuntu** conveys the idea of strength based on the qualities of compassion, care, gentleness, respect, and empathy.

The holistic nature of the African self is also indicated by the belief that each individual is a **vital force in participation** with other vital forces. These vital forces are composed not only of other people but of animals, plants, the ancestors, and even elements of the inanimate world. Many other non-Western cultures also believe in a relatedness with the larger universe and with the past.

The fundamental **connectedness** of human beings to each other determines the overt expression of such inner attributes as abilities, opinions, judgements and personality characteristics. Voluntary "control of the inner attributes constitutes the core of the cultural ideal of becoming mature. The understanding of one's autonomy as secondary to, and constrained by, the primary task of interdependence distinguishes interdependent selves from independent selves, for whom autonomy and its expression is often afforded primary significance" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 227).

Markus and Kitayama (1991) discuss the consequences which the divergent construals of the independent and interdependent selves have for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Although it is not possible to present their discussion in detail, attention needs to be drawn to the distinction they emphasize between **ego focused** and **other focused** emotions. Anger, frustration, and pride have the individual's internal attributes as the primary referent, whereas empathy and shame have another person, rather than one's internal attributes, as the primary referent.

In independent cultures "Not to attend to one's inner feelings is often viewed as being inauthentic or even as denying the 'real' self. In contrast, among those with more interdependent selves, one's inner feelings may be less important in determining one's consequent actions ... For those with interdependent selves, it is the interpersonal context that assumes priority over the inner attributes, such as private feelings. The latter may need to be controlled or de-emphasized so as to effectively fit into the interpersonal context" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 236).

Especially intense experiences of ego-focused emotions, such as anger, are to be avoided by those with interdependent selves. "It is not that these people have learned to inhibit or suppress their 'real' anger but that they have learned the importance of attending to others, considering others, and being gentle in all situations, and as a consequence very little anger is elicited" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 236). The Inuit label angry behaviour observed in foreigners as childish. In Japanese culture "Self-assertion is not viewed as being authentic, but instead as being immature" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 229), while "patterns of what Westerners call 'hostility' are scarcely found in many cultures" (Gergen & Gergen, 1988, p. 42).

The significance of Carl Rogers' contribution is undoubtedly to be found in the universality of two of his core therapeutic conditions, empathy and regard or respect. In a previous publication I pointed out the similarities between the Person-Centered approach and the practices of the indigenous healers of southern Africa (Holdstock, 1981). However, the relationship is not all that straightforward. While it holds for empathy and positive regard, it is less obvious as far as the third 'necessary and sufficient' condition, congruence, is concerned. The concept of congruence, especially the expressive component of it, relates more closely with the ego-focused manifestation of the independent self. Just how to effect a marriage between expressing one's inner feelings and facilitating one's relatedness to others, is an open question. Gordon (1974) came up with the suggestion of "I" messages and presented an operationalization of what constitutes an "I" message. However, the therapeutic effectiveness is, in my personal experience, a debatable issue, even in a cultural context oriented towards the independent self.

In the meantime the name change from Client-Centered therapy to the Person-Centered approach challenges the therapeutic community to extend the empathy and regard of the therapy hour to all aspects of their daily lives. In terms of the present terminology it strives to create an awareness in the psychological community and Western culture at large, of the qualities of respect and empathy which characterize interdependent cultures, whether of non-Western or Western origin.

IS PSYCHOLOGY DESTINED TO REMAIN MONOCULTURAL, INDIVIDUOCENTRIC AND REACTIVE?

Although the growing concern about the disunity in and monocultural nature of psychology represents two relatively independent developments, both reflect the dis-ease with the fragmented nature of psychology and the model of the autonomous individual as the unit of the social system. Sobering as it is "to reflect on the psychic costs, the existential penalties of our egocentrism" (Shweder & Bourne, 1989, p. 132), and on the disastrously myopic insularity of our balkanized discipline, the danger exists that our awakening awareness of the interdependent self will keep us at the level of interpersonal dynamics. While Rome is burning we are trying to put out individual flames and experimenting with new brands of fire extinguisher. Psychology remains totally impotent in preventing or playing a part in resolving any of the major conflicts which continue to erupt without any sign of abatement. While we construct and administer our never-ending stream of questionnaires, and assess the activity of the brain in terms of microvolts and milliseconds, the petrol bombs, fire bombs, cruise missiles, detentions, military vehicles, battle ships and phantom fighter planes, poverty, discrimination, injustice and pollution, continue unabated.

It is therefore imperative, as a number of critical thinkers have indicated, that the relation of psychology to political ideology, socio-economic conditions and cultural ideologies, be recognised. We need to become aware of the extent to which psychology serves the interests of those in power, whether those interests be of an economic, political or ideological nature. Cognisance needs to be taken of the extent to which psychology is determined by and perpetuates the sociopolitical status quo (Prilleltensky, 1989), and also the indigenous ideologies of Western culture, of which the scientism of the 19th century is perhaps the most important. Apart from critical voices within mainstream psychology about our outmoded quest for truth in psychology, several of the younger generation of thinkers have drawn interesting conclusions about the relationship between psychology and the political reality. For example, systems theory has been described as "an inherently conservative approach" (Carchedi, 1983, p. 27), while empiricism has been equated with

racism (Barker, 1983). Akbar (1984) states "that in the garb of 'science' the Western world has utilized a social and psychological paradigm that functions to legitimize the assertion of their racial and national superiority. What has been assumed to be an apolitical, objective system is, in fact, the essence of Euro-American, Caucasian politics" (p.400-401).

According to such social theorists and historians as Foucault, Gergen, Hales, and Harre, "Any attempt to remove individuals from the history and culture in which they are embedded and to study them as isolated, decontextualized nomads is, from a constructionist point of view, a neo-Enlightenment fantasy - it is simply not doable ... psychologists' findings are embedded in a particular sociopolitical matrix and, like any social artifact, are naturally prescriptive as well as descriptive" (Cushman, 1991, p. 206).

Not only does our reactive approach, whether in the laboratory or the therapy hour, prevent the promotion of a proactive approach, but as is the case in medicine, could be responsible for iatrogenic illnesses and many of our problems in living. In addition to the above critical voices, Jungian psychiatrists and psychologists (eg. Hillman, 1975; Perry, 1974), Africentric psychologists and others from within Western culture have called for a closer examination of the iatrogenic nature of our reactive stance (Szasz, 1961, 1987).

Africentricity has grown "out of the increasing inadequacy of the Eurocentric model to address the escalating social problems of Western society adequately" (Akbar, 1984, p. 412). Akbar cautions that "The Africentric model must be viewed as a perspective independent of the Eurocentric model; otherwise, it too will become merely reactive and therefore persistently dependent on the European model" (p. 398-399). He quotes Nobles as stating that "'Western Science, particularly social science, like the economic and political institutions has become an instrument designed to reflect the culture of the oppressor and to allow for the more efficient domination and oppression of African peoples'" (p. 395). He then goes on to say that "Consequently, the uncritical acceptance of the assumptions of Western science by African peoples is to participate in our own domination and oppression" (p. 395).

Concern about the individuocentric-reactive nature of Western psychology has grown hand in hand with the aware-

ness that psychology is a monocultural discipline, although these two concerns have, in many instances, developed quite independently of one other. The transition from the modern to the postmodern era and the advancement towards a globally linked world system (Sampson, 1989a) have certainly been major contributing factors in the development of the multi-cultural and proactive perspectives. Instead of proliferating inwardly as it has done in the past, psychology needs to proliferate outwardly if it has any pretensions of becoming an international discipline and if it wants to deal more effectively with the mushrooming mental health crisis in the Western world.

In terms of the relatively unrecognised yet very real embeddedness of psychology in political ideologies, it is important to be fully cognisant of the responsibility ensuing from the enormous power wielded by the collective force of Western psychology. Moghaddam (1987) has recently proposed a division of psychology in terms of global power groups. The first power block consists of the United States, the second of all the other industrially developed nations and the third of the technologically undeveloped nations.

Psychology in the United States is regarded as the first power block because of the large numbers of psychologists (more than 108,000 - Staats, 1991), extensive research infrastructure and voluminous publications. Its influence in dictating the direction and pace of development of the discipline is enormous, and becomes even greater when it is fused with that of the second power block. Virtually the entire global psychological community is represented by these two major groupings. It is, therefore, imperative that the psychological world powers take a critical look at the way they conduct their discipline and practise their profession.

When this is done it becomes immediately apparent that the psychological community is predominantly white and Western. Despite its great diversity psychology remains a monocultural discipline. It strikes me as peculiarly paradoxical that this is the case and that the tremendous diversity within psychology is all of an inbred nature. On the one hand the discipline has seen a tremendous proliferation of specialities and subspecialities, while on the other it has been extraordinarily unaware of indigenous psychological perspectives outside its own framework.

This lack of awareness of the psychological realities of nonwestern cultures also finds expression in the unawareness of the importance of our own cultural belief system. The title of one of Smedslund's (1984) papers, **The invisible obvious: Culture in psychology**, is an apt description of this unawareness. Trimble (1988) finds that less than 1% of the pages of 14 prominent social psychology texts pay the concept of culture any attention at all. Shweder and Bourne (1989, 1991) have recently stated that it is not yet fully appreciated "that the relationship between what one thinks about (for example, other people) and how one thinks (for example, 'context and cases') may be mediated by the world view to which one is committed (for example, holism) and by the metaphors by which one lives" (1989, p. 133; 1991, p. 155). Thus, while there is a growing awareness of the relation between psychology, socio-economic- and political factors, awareness of the extent to which psychology is embedded in the ideology of the indigenous Western culture which gave it birth still needs to develop. Similarly, awareness of the importance of other indigenous cultures, also needs to develop.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE NETHERLANDS: FRAGMENTED AND INDIVIDUALISTIC

At this stage a number of readers are likely to be feeling that the discussion is all well and good, but that it applies primarily to psychology in the United States. However, the trademarks of a monocultural Western psychology described thus far, are as, if not more, applicable in the Netherlands. Due to the nature of Dutch higher education, specialization occurs sooner than in the English speaking countries. In contrast to the English speaking universities, where psychology is taught as one of several subjects at undergraduate level, it is the only subject taught during the doctorandis degree.

Specialization is even more apparent at graduate level. From the outset, when second phase education was introduced, a clearcut differentiation was made between graduate education of an applied and of a research nature. The applied programme was geared towards obtaining a diploma of professional registration and the research programme towards obtaining the PhD degree. Thus, an alternative graduate

degree such as the PsyD, awarded by the professional psychology programmes in the United States, has not even been considered. In fact, the applied programme in the Netherlands has been labelled 'post-academic' education in the governmental policy statement in which the scientific development for the nineties has been outlined (Tweede Kamer, 1989). It is with respect to this degree of specialization or fragmentation, depending on how one cares to interpret the development, that the post-academic training of clinical psychologists in the Netherlands is distinctly different from that in English speaking countries. Not only does it differ with respect to the amount of practical experience required, but it is devoid of any research requirements. At most, a brief theoretical course on research in psychotherapy or experimental investigations in psychotherapy is offered. The split between psychology as an applied and as a research discipline at graduate level seems to be complete.

Even at undergraduate level the same fragmentation has been introduced here at the Free University. In the latest reorganisation plan the research activities of the department of clinical psychology have been terminated. In contrast to the developments at graduate level, the initiative in this instance came from outside the clinical camp. In view of the fact that "the only thing truly exceptional about clinical psychology in the health disciplines has been its mixture of research and practice" (Trierweiler, 1987, p. 410) the current developments in the education and training of clinical psychologists in the Netherlands and at the Free University must be regarded with the greatest of misgivings. The frittering away of the exceptional position described by Trierweiler is, in all likelihood, probably the forerunner of a totally new structure to psychology as a discipline and as an administrative unit. As Scott (1991) predicts, the administrative entity we know as psychology will disintegrate in the coming century. It is with trepidation, but also with excitement, that we can await and be part of future ~~pedagogische~~ development.

Dames en Heren,

Nu ik aan het einde van mijn rede gekomen ben, wil ik naar goed en oud gebruik het Bestuur van de Faculteit der Psychologie en Pedagogische Wetenschappen, het College van Bestuur en de Vereniging voor Christelijk Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs bedanken voor respectievelijk de voordracht en de benoeming tot hoogleraar in de Klinische Psychologie en Konfliktologie. Ik ben u zeer erkentelijk voor het vertrouwen dat u in mij stelt.

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Ik heb gezegd.

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